University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

12-12-2019

Nof Kdumim: Remaking the Ancient Landscape in East
Jerusalem’s National Parks
Irus Braverman
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Place and Environment Commons, and the Urban Studies and
Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Irus Braverman, Nof Kdumim: Remaking the Ancient Landscape in East Jerusalem’s National Parks, 4
Env't & Plan. E 109 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/1009

Irus Braverman, Nof Kdumim: Remaking the Ancient Landscape in East Jerusalem’s National Parks, Environment
and Planning E: Nature and Space 4(1) pp. 104-139. Copyright © 2021, © SAGE Publications. Reprinted by
permission of SAGE Publications.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Nof Kdumim

Remaking the Ancient Landscape in East Jerusalem’s National Parks
Irus Braverman
Landscape is a historical and cultural entity, made through law, not nature—it belongs to a
polity, not a species.
---John Wylie, Landscape 2007, 197.
Introduction
The national parks system worldwide has traditionally concerned itself with nature
protection and with imperiled plants and animals, not with urban landscapes and human ruins
(Howkins et al. 2016). In Israel, too, the historic mission of the state agency dealing with
national parks and nature reserves—Israel’s National Parks Authority (INPA)—has been the
protection of nature. As stated on this agency’s website: “The Israel Nature and Parks Authority
protects nature, including habitats, ecosystems, and plant and animal diversity in nature reserves,
national parks and open spaces” (INPA 2019).
A law passed by the Knesset in 1963 created two separate entities—the nature reserve
authority, which focused on “nature,” and the national parks and archeological sites, which
focused on “culture.” These two entities were unified in 1998 “for the purpose of fulfilling the
goals of the National Parks Law, the Nature Reserves and Commemoration Sites Law and the
Wildlife Protection Law” (ibid.). The mission of INPA has thus expanded from its core “green”
agenda to include preserving and managing “the special look of typical landscapes throughout
the country for the benefit of all inhabitants, while protecting the balance between economic,
social, cultural and environmental needs” (ibid.). The dynamics and inherent tensions between
“natural” and “cultural” landscapes and their preservation are an inherent part of national park
administrations worldwide, and Israel is no exception in this regard (but see my critique of this
binary in Braverman 2014; 2015).
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There is arguably no place that embodies the tensions between the nature and culture
aspects of national parks management—and the conflicts and entanglements between different
types of nature and different forms of culture in particular—more than East Jerusalem’s growing
chain of national parks. This article explores two national parks in East Jerusalem (in its
extended, post-1967, boundaries) and the politics of their governmentalization as part of
contradictory and complementary attempts at preservation, colonization, and normalization.
Drawing on in-depth interviews with, and observations of, officials from Israel’s Nature and
Park Authority and fieldworkers from environmental and human rights nonprofits, conducted in
the region between 2016 and 2019, I expose the ongoing project of Judaizing the Jerusalem
landscape and the hybrid forms of colonialism that enable and that are reinforced through this
project.
The natural landscape never stands for itself. “Its role in mediating social and cultural
reproduction works through its ability to stand for something: norms, values, fears and so on”
(Schein 2003, 202-3). In fact, “far from being an image or construction of culture-nature
relations, [landscape] is their very entanglement” (Wylie 2007, 205). It is always an echo of a
human presence, and in this case of a Jewish past and its modern reunion. The project of
imagining the natural landscape as one that embodies an ancient past—what Israeli officials have
referred to in our interviews as nof kdumim and adam ba’har—and the contemporary Jewish
people as those who hold the key to its revival as such, is a crucial aspect of Israel’s colonial
dispossession agenda and a mandatory passage before the land can become Jewish in practice
(Bardenstein 1998; Braverman 2009; Fields 2010; Long 2009; Said 2000; Zerubavel 1995).
Focusing on the narratives by Israel’s nature officials, this article argues that we need to pay
closer attention to the messiness of the natural and cultural—or “natureculture” (Haraway
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2003)—heritage enterprise so as to contemplate how forms of colonial appropriation and
environmental conservation coalesce in this context (see, more broadly, Agrawal and Redford
2009; Davis 2013; Peluso 1993; Spence 1999).
I focus, specifically, on two national park sites in the Jerusalem area: Silwan / City of
David National Park, at the core of the city, and Walaje / Refa’im Valley National Park, a few
kilometers southwest (Figure 1). Whereas Israeli authorities have been systematically
dispossessing Palestinians by designating both locations as a national park, nature reserve, and/or
archeological site, differences between the two locations also emerge that exemplify the
innovativeness of the natural landscape idea. Alongside the direct takeover strategies, I also
detail practices of normalization enacted in the Jerusalem parks, which include the promotion of
recreation and tourism. Arguably, at both locations Jewish settlers enjoy the mostly tacit, yet
increasingly explicit, support of Israel’s official nature protection agencies and, in fact, in many
instances they hold central positions in these agencies and constitute its ideological backbone.
They are the new, yet purportedly authentic, spokespersons for nature.
My choice to focus on the national park administration in Jerusalem was not incidental.
Jerusalem is, in many ways, a boundary object—both adaptable to different viewpoints and
robust enough to maintain identity across them (Leigh Star and Griesemer 1989). In 1967, Israel
occupied, and immediately annexed, the neighborhoods in eastern Jerusalem together with the
land of 28 Palestinian communities in the adjacent West Bank into what thereafter has become
known as East Jerusalem. A basic law enacted in 1980 further declared Jerusalem as the united
capital of Israel. From Israel’s point of view, then, Jerusalem is an integral part of its sovereign
territory. From an international law perspective, however, East Jerusalem is an inseparable part
of the area occupied by Israel in 1967 and is thus governed by the international laws of
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occupation, including the Fourth Geneva Convention. In practice, this legal ambiguity means
that some 500 thousand Palestinian Jerusalemites live a hybrid existence: not having full
citizenship but rather a “permanent residency” status, their right to continue dwelling in their
Jerusalemite homes is always precarious (Shlomo 2017). Under the “center of life” doctrine, for
example, if a Palestinian resident of Jerusalem lives elsewhere for a certain period she would risk
losing her residency status and thus her very access to the city (Tawil-Souri 2012).
The disparity between Palestinian land and the people who inhabit it is also evident in the
context of East Jerusalem’s national parks, whereby the Israel Antiquities Authority, a
government agency, is responsible for the excavation and preservation of archaeological sites,
but the legal status of the Palestinian residents who live on top of these ruins does not enable
their participation in the decision-making process that pertains to these sites. Thus, “a gap is
created between the legal status of the Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem and that of the
archaeological remains among which they live,” which in turn engenders violations of the local
communities’ heritage rights (Emek Shaveh 2019c).
On the books, Israel and the occupied West Bank are each governed by distinct national
park regimes. On the one hand, within the State of Israel, the Israel National Parks Authority
(INPA) manages 530 national parks and nature reserves, of which 373 were officially designated
under the detailed legal regime established initially in 1964 and further developed with the said
merge between national parks and nature reserves in 1998 (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2015). While nearly 22 percent of Israel’s land area is designated as nature reserves or national
parks (Haaretz 2017), East Jerusalem’s parks are distinct in that they are the only parks in the
country that are situated in densely inhabited residential locations. On the other hand, in the
occupied West Bank (currently Area C), the Civil Administration manages nature reserves and
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parks through the military occupation regime established there by Israel in 1967 and revised by
the Oslo Accords of the 1990s. By the end of the 1990s, the Military Commander of the Area
declared some 48 nature reserves and parks in the West Bank (Imadeddin 2017). The military
orders impose severe development restrictions that prevent any new construction or agricultural
cultivation inside the park’s boundaries, as I have explored elsewhere (Braverman 2019).
East Jerusalem’s national parks are arguably a hybrid between the two national park
systems. While the Jerusalem parks are officially governed by Israeli state agencies according to
Israeli laws, they are considered an occupied territory according to international law. The
liminality of East Jerusalem can teach us about both the continuities and the slippages between
national parks in these two seemingly distinct jurisdictions, and, respectively, about the fluid
properties of nature protection in this region. On the ground, then, Jerusalem is a microcosm of
the Palestinians’ precarious condition, where one finds a porous and messy rule of law through
ideas about nature that lend themselves to “gray” landscapes (Yitachel 2009). The importance of
law for the formation of landscape was emphasized by geographer Kenneth Olwig, who defined
landscape as “a nexus of law and cultural identity” (Olwig 2002, 19). Hybrid legalities are
intricately connected with, and mutually reinforced by, hybrid landscapes as well as hybrid
forms of colonialism—namely, ones that travel in between settler colonial and colonial regimes
(Busbridge 2018; Veracini 2006; 2013; Wolfe 2006).
Place Figure 1 here: National parks and nature reserves in the Jerusalem area, 2018. The
national parks discussed here are marked as “Walls of Jerusalem” and “Nahal Refa’im.”
Courtesy of Emek Shaveh.
Childhood Landscape and Memory in Jerusalem
While it may seem removed from mundane life, law is in fact deeply entangled with
personal stories of “lives lived,” with biography and narrative (Wylie 2007, 210). Telling such
small stories can thus serve as a supplement, and at times even an antidote, to the grander
5

narratives of history. Specifically, the landscape is arguably written through the subjective
tensions between legal and illegal, movement and dwelling, memory and forgetting, and outside
and inside. In the words of geographer John Wylie: “The notion of landscape and self [is]
essentially written through experiences of mobility and exile” (2007, 211; see also Dubow 2004;
Sebald 1998).
Although I grew up in Jerusalem after 1967, when East Jerusalem was already occupied
by Israel and then immediately annexed, I do not have childhood memories of visiting the City
of David, its Shiloah spring, or its water aqueduct. The landscape of my youth was, instead, the
Palestinian village of Tsur Bacher, an eclectic jumble of stone houses hugging the hill that filled
the view from my bedroom window, since we lived in the last row of houses in old Talpiot. This
was also the landscape that adorned my childhood paintings.
My first encounter with the City of David came much later, during my military training
as an education officer (“mashakit hinuch”). I was one of a handful of officers selected to
educate soldier groups in and about Jerusalem. The City of David was the first topic we taught in
every weeklong training seminar (“sidrat hinuch”). We would stand in the Haas Promenade that
overlooks Jerusalem from the south and ask the soldiers to erase everything from the landscape
and imagine this point of origin. We would then point to the exact location where the settlement
in Jerusalem and, with it, the people of Israel, were formed. What was much less present in our
educational narratives, if at all, was the complexity of the contemporary Jerusalem landscape.
And thus the village scenery of my childhood was replaced by a more unidirectional narrative
that focused on resurrecting the biblical past through archeological ruins without consideration of
the houses built on their top or of those who currently dwell in this landscape.
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A few weeks into my idyllic instruction days in the army, in December 1987 the first
Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, had begun. I have a blurry memory of myself inside the wet
underground aqueduct within the City of David compound, attempting to climb out into the light
of day but trapped by stones hurled down toward me and the soldiers I was responsible for. I
remember wondering: what did we ever do to these people that would make them so angry at us?
The two to three years of military service, which for many soldiers are a time of patriotic
indoctrination, equipped me instead with painful realizations about Israel’s colonial rule, and
after it ended I hadn’t set foot in the City of David for more than thirty years.
Until the summer of 2019, when I visited from New York in an attempt to schedule an
interview with the director of Elad, the rightwing Israeli nonprofit organization that now
manages the City of David National Park. A few hours after David Be’eri agreed to speak with
me and show me around the park, his secretary called to cancel the interview and visit. They
were unwilling to suggest any alternative times. I decided to stick with my plans to visit the park,
but to do so as a tourist. The site was nothing like I had remembered. The extensive excavations
that took place there since the 1990s resulted in new visitor areas. The tucked-away entry
became a massive one, replete with large signs, a souvenir shop, and changing rooms. And while
the receipt I was handed upon payment was for entry into a national park, and so were the flags
and signs positioned across the site, the night shows, special tours, and regular e-mail prompts
that began flooding my inbox since the visit were less typical of a state park and more in line
with a commercial tourist attraction. This normalization, and capitalization, of the park as a
recreational site is arguably a central tactic in rendering it part of the natural landscape, one that
is readily available to tourists who are shopping for a spiritual experience during their visit to the
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Holy Land, as well as to Israeli students and soldiers who are thus taught biblical lessons about
national and ethnic belonging.
Place Figure 2 here: The entrance to the aqueduct, with a guard and signs indicating that
this is the Warren Shaft and part of the City of David National Park. A Jerusalem
municipality bench on left. Photo by author, July 5, 2019.
Place Figure 3 here: The “Herodian Street.” New makeshift excavations in the City of
David create an underground link between the City of David and the “Temple Mount” and
Old City. Photo by author, July 5, 2019.
Place Figure 4 here: Palestinians and leftwing groups protest against another demolition
order in Silwan at the entrance to the City of David National Park. The signs read Dai
La’Kibush (“End the Occupation”). Photo by author, July 5, 2019.
Silwan: The City of David National Park
The current national parks system in Jerusalem was established through a series of legal
designations. In 1974, Israel designated the National Park “Jerusalem City Walls—City of
David” as a green belt around the Old City Walls. This national park already existed in the
British plans and was later recognized by the Jordanians, who controlled this area from 1948
through 1967. In our interview, urban planner Efrat Cohen Bar of the nonprofit organization
Bimkom for Justice in Urban Planning distinguished between the “innocent” and “not so
innocent” eras of national parks management. In her words: “if the Old City Walls park was part
of the British Plan and the ideal of separating the old from the new, then Tsurim Valley National
Parks that was declared in 2000 and the Mount Scopus Slopes National Park that was declared in
2005 are part of the current, not so innocent, era” (Cohen Bar, interview). The City of David
National Park is the pulsing heart of the “not so innocent” era, according to Cohen Bar. Although
one might contest her characterization of the British Mandatory designations as innocent (see,
e.g., Schorr 2014), the differences between the historic and the more recent designations in
Jerusalem, which have only intensified in the last decade, are worth consideration, if only for
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acknowledging the changes in the legal, administrative, and political modes of governing these
parks, which, again, result in the landscape’s making.
After 1967, massive archeological excavations commenced in the City of David.
Managed by Israel’s Antiquities Authorities, these excavations have centered around the Gichon
spring and the Shiloach tunnel. The digs have only intensified since Elad started managing the
site in 2002. In 2018, the Israeli government allocated a record sum of approximately 15 million
US dollars for archaeological excavations in Silwan / City of David (Emek Shaveh 2019b). For
the 40 thousand or so Palestinian residents of Silwan, the inclusion of their village within the
national park has meant that they have been subject to draconian restrictions on construction and
renovations (ibid.). These residents claim that the Israeli authorities have made it virtually
impossible to obtain building permits, and so they are compelled to construct illegally. Such
illegal constructions have in turn resulted in over one hundred demolition orders in Silwan. The
year 2019 also saw a significant increase in the number of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem
who have had to demolish their own home to avoid paying the city had the municipal authority
carried out the demolition (B’Tselem 2019; for a broader exploration of the forced adaptation to
Israeli and municipal administration see Shlomo 2017). At the same time, the archaeological digs
have weakened the foundation of many of the physical structures in Silwan, in turn resulting in
the need for further construction, which is, again, deemed illegal—and so the cycle of illegality
continues to spiral (Braverman 2007).
Meanwhile, the rightwing Jewish groups Ateret Kohanim and Elad have been purchasing
Palestinian properties in the area, with the explicit goal of Judaizing East Jerusalem. In 2015, 54
outposts accommodated approximately 400 Jewish settlers in the Al-Boustan and Wadi Hilweh
neighborhoods of Silwan (UN Human Settlements Programme 2015). In 2018, Amendment 17 to
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the National Parks, Nature Reserves and Memorial Sites Law was underway. The Amendment,
entitled “Planning for Housing in an Existing Neighborhood in a National Park,” would apply
only to the City of David National Park, thereby overturning the long-standing legal prohibition
against building inside national parks. This Amendment has been perceived by many as intended
for the sole purpose of legalizing the otherwise illegal constructions by Jewish settlers within the
park (Haaretz 2018).
Nowadays, the relationship between the Antiquities Authority, INPA, and the East
Jerusalem settlers is nothing other than symbiotic. But this has not always been the case. To
understand how the current situation has come about, it is necessary to step a few years back.
Toward the end of the first Intifada in the early 1990s, Israel’s Antiquities Authority came into
conflict with the East Jerusalemite settlers and their political patrons led by then Minister of
Housing Ariel Sharon. The settlers wanted to build 200 residential units on the ruins of the City
of David, but the Antiquities Authority refused to grant them permits. The Authority’s legal
advisor explained this refusal: “The Antiquities Authority categorically maintains that it is vital
to preserve the City of David, and that no construction whatsoever should be conducted at the
site. Only archaeological excavations, works of conservation and reconstruction should be
undertaken in the City of David area” (quoted in Emek Shaveh 2014a; see also Emek Shaveh
2013; 2014b). A decade or two later, development plans in the City of David are now promoted
collaboratively by the Antiquities Authority, INPA, the Jerusalem municipality, and the Elad
Association (ibid.).
How to explain this dramatic change in policy? Following a petition to Israel’s High
Court of Justice in 1998, the Israel Lands Authority withdrew its plan to hand over the area to the
Elad Association and, at the end of 2000, the site was placed under the authority of INPA. In
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practice, however, in 2002 INPA signed a contract with Elad that authorized Elad to manage and
operate the site. According to the Israeli nonprofit Emek Shaveh, this constituted “the
complete surrender of control over scientific and tourist activity in Jerusalem’s historic basin to
religious entities with a clear agenda.” Emek Shaveh further claimed that
For the government and the settlers, archaeology has become a political tool of the
highest order. . . . The transcripts, e-mail exchanges and financial balance sheets upon
which this report is based tell an extraordinary tale of how a government agency becomes
party to the agenda of a rightwing association, of how this association’s values are
adopted by a public service, and of the manner in which the history of Jerusalem is recast
as a marketable national (Israeli) commodity (Emek Shaveh 2014a; see also Mizrachi,
interview and Abu El-Haj 2008).
In July 2017, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced his plans for the
completion of the Kedem Center—a seven-story building spanning an area of 16,000 square
meters, at the heart of the City of David / Silwan. This development is part of a larger project
that will include a cable car over the protected Ben Hinnom Valley and new access routes to the
Western Wall, circumventing physical passage through the Palestinian parts of East Jerusalem
and thus making access more predictable, controllable, and marketable. While such massive
developments have been taking place in its surroundings, the Shiloach pool itself is still not fully
excavated nor fully developed due to ownership disputes with the Greek Orthodox Church
(Figure 5). Despite attempts to conceal this at the general site, the pool and its spring are very
much a microcosm of the park’s legal-natural landscape of contest and ruin (see also Braverman
2019).
Place Figure 5 here: A tourist group outside of the Shiloach pool in the City of David
National Park, amidst the “refugee camp landscape” of the Palestinian village of Silwan.
Photo by author, February 2018.
In spite of the contest, ruin, and dispossession embodied in this landscape (or precisely
because of it), some 500 thousand visitors, Jewish American tourists as well as Israeli students
and soldiers, still flock to the City of David every year. In one of the park’s central attractions,
11

visitors are promised an adventurous wet experience by walking through the underground First
Temple aqueduct. And although the narrative promoted by the park’s visitor center has a
distinctly Jewish focus, an official from the Israel Antiquities Authority stressed that “the work
we do here is not about looking for a particular heritage of one or other. We find what there is
and display what there is” (BBC 2010). I will revisit this universalist heritage scheme shortly.
At the same time, the close administrative ties between the rightwing settler group of
Elad and INPA are not even hidden as the current director of the latter is an ideological settler
himself, and served previously as Chairman of the Yesha Council (the umbrella organization of
municipal councils of Jewish settlements in the West Bank). A report issued by Emek Shaveh
thus asked in this context:
What’s the connection between a National Park and a political conflict? Why is it
Jerusalem, of all Israeli cities, that has the most national parks, and why are most of them
in East Jerusalem? How are archaeological sites and excavations used as tools in the
struggle for public opinion, and as a means of taking control of lands belonging to
Palestinian residents? (2014a; see also Greenberg 2009; Kersel 2015).
The project of rendering East Jerusalem’s national parks, nature reserves, and
archeological sites accessible and even popular tourist sites is arguably a central tenet in the
normalization of Jewish settlements and the Judaization of the landscape more broadly. Under
the rubric of recreation and entertainment, the national park status of parts of Silwan allow the
public to feel comfortable by obscuring the particular geopolitics of this occupied and conflicted
site and making it into a park just like any other. It would, accordingly, be a mistake to think that
the passion for archeology and biblical connectivity are only experienced by rightwing radicals.
Indeed, the City of David National Park is one of the mandatory sites promoted for school
fieldtrips that is included in curriculums across the country. Such normalization practices that
occur in the territories occupied in 1967 are thus inseparable from the Zionist (settler) colonial
ideology as practiced within Israel’s 1948 borders and in turn also seep back into the occupied
12

territories (Allegra et al. 2017, 3). Nonetheless, the process of erasing the City of David National
Park’s particular geopolitical location through its normalization as a tourist recreation site is
arguably incomplete, as many Jewish Israelis—my family and friends included—still view this
part of East Jerusalem as dangerous and refrain from visiting there.
Green-Gray Legalities in Jerusalem
INPA directly manages all national parks and nature reserves within Israel. This form of
management is complicated in the urban and political context of Jerusalem, where the park
constitutes “an authority within an authority,” thereby illuminating both the tensions between,
and the creative powers of, the combined governance by a national nature authority and a
municipal body. From INPA’s perspective, the City of David National Park is part of a much
broader and more ambitious Master Plan for green corridors in and around Jerusalem, newly
referred to as the Jerusalem Park.
The Jerusalem Park is the largest national park in Israel and encompasses 15,000 dunam,
or 15 square kilometers. The reason that these areas were not simply declared green zones within
Jerusalem’s municipal plans but were instead designated as national parks under the National
Parks Law, as one INPA official explained to me, was the realization that this area needed a
long-term vision that would not be swayed by mundane politics (INPA official “C,” interview).
Indeed, once a national park or nature reserve is declared, it is considerably difficult to alter this
designation. “It’s a law that the state made to tell itself that these are national assets that need to
be preserved for generations. And once a space has been declared, it means we have formed this
decision for years” (ibid.). In other words, the national park landscape is perceived as stronger
than everyday politics and as reflecting the interests of future generations. At the same time, it
sets in stone (often literally) a particular way of seeing that de facto strips current owners of the
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land from many of their rights, including the right to build and in some instances also the right to
cultivate and graze within their private property. In the name of a benevolent public need for
green space, certain populations—but not others—are deprived of their ownership rights without
compensation, as a national parks designation is neither considered a legal taking nor an
appropriation (Braverman 2019). This again brings home the understanding that “law plays a
central role in the constitution of landscape” (Olwig 2005, 296). The rule of law becomes even
more important in the face of the apparent injustice of Israel’s dispossession of Palestinians,
contributing to hyperlegal landscapes subject to intense classifications and heightened
surveillance and control (Braverman 2019).
In the 1990s, INPA authorized the Jerusalem municipality to manage the national parks
within the city’s boundaries. This arrangement eventually led to considerable tensions between
the two government bodies. INPA official “C” recalled:
In 2000, we . . . found that Ben Hinnom Valley was the biggest dump yard in Jerusalem. I
mean, every East Jerusalemite who had to throw a dead donkey did so in the Wadi
[valley] down here below [points to site]. And when we started removing waste, we
additionally found waste of the Jerusalem municipality itself that was doing work to
preserve the Jewish quarter and dumped waste here in the Ben Hinnom Valley. . . . We
restored all of this. People live here. These are private parcels, and [Palestinians] were
suspicious of these [changes] initiated by us. [They were convinced that] first we would
come to their land and start working here, [and then] the settlers will come and take it.
We told them that we’re coming here and arranging and cleaning, [but] these are your
trees, and you get the olives (interview).
Again, the INPA officer sees his work as concerned only with waste removal and other such
benevolent green initiatives that pertain to the landscape and its management, which the
Palestinians in turn interpret as political, thus supposedly confusing the fair and neutral conduct
of the nature agency with the settlers’ political dispossession tactics. On the ground, however, a
much less categorical distinction between settlers and INPA is at play, as I have shown.
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A more recent legal strategy deployed by INPA for “cleaning and greening” the
Jerusalem landscape has been its utilization of Gardening Ordinances. These provide yet another
apt example of INPA’s ingenious legal creativity when it comes to managing private Palestinian
lands in Jerusalem, this time by deploying a municipal power that it would not possess
otherwise. In the words of INPA official C:
The municipality can enter private property that is neglected and garden it. It doesn’t
appropriate it, doesn’t take it, not mine or yours, I’m just cleaning here. You’re entering
someone’s private property and gardening it. Even within a national park, I can’t enter
someone’s private property [to do such a thing].
The utilization of municipal powers by a national authority highlights the strategic benefits of the
hybrid national-urban park in the Jerusalem setting. Such gray legalities provide an opportunity
for further control of the landscape and its residents. In 2017, Bimkom petitioned the courts
against the greening ordinances practice for its violation of Palestinian ownership and won, albeit
for technical reasons (Cohen Bar, interview).
Refugee Camp Landscape vs. Nof Kdumim
While the cultural and natural emphases may, and often do, result in uneasy tensions
between and within Israel’s national parks and archeological authorities, in East Jerusalem they
are deployed interchangeably as complimentary technologies of dispossession and are connected
in myriad ways. Notably, the greening of the Jerusalem landscape is not strictly an
environmental project; it is also a central tenet of the visual and discursive making of this
landscape into nof kdumim—an ancient (read: biblical) landscape. As INPA official “C,” himself
an orthodox Jew and a settler, explained: “We want to make [this area] look like the built
landscape that should surround ancient Jerusalem, and not the refugee camps landscape that it
currently is. To do this, you need a plan.” Memory and identity become embodied in the
landscape through detailed zoning plans and legal schemes.
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Edward Said insisted that the promotion of a convincing narrative that would accompany
the imaginary landscape is a necessary precursor to the actual remaking of the physical landscape
and one of the powerful successes of the Zionist enterprise. In his words: “What we never
understood was the power of a narrative history to mobilize people around a common goal. In
the case of Israel, the narrative’s main point was that Zionism’s goal was to restore, reestablish,
repatriate, and reconnect a people with its original homeland” (2000, 184). Along the project of
drawing connections through landscaping practices, Said also discussed the project of active
elimination through the landscape, highlighting that “the Jewish discourse eliminates from the
landscape the former Palestinian presence” (ibid., 191; see also Bardenstein 1998; Zerubavel
1995, 63). “I have a role,” the INPA official told me as we stood on Mount Scopus, overlooking
the Judean desert toward the east (Figure 6) (his tone reminiscent of MLK’s “I have a dream”).
He then outlined the proposed plan for Mount Scopus Slopes National Park:
I need to promote what, in my eyes, is worthwhile for preservation for future generations.
[Most importantly,] we need to preserve nof kdumim. We in INPA respect all the cultures
that have passed through here for thousands of years: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, the
New and Old Testament. Jerusalem is not a private story of ours. Jerusalem has its own
story, and it is this story, along with a wide array of others, that we want to preserve
(interview, INPA official “C”).
This vision of an egalitarian battle between the refugee and the biblical landscapes is especially
ironic, as the refugee landscape is in fact very much a result of the ideology underlying the
biblical one—indeed, its violent and spectacular imposition—rather than a landscape of choice
by Palestinian Jerusalemites. In this sense, the making is always a remaking—and requires an
elimination of another landscape, which is a central feature of settler colonialism (Wolfe 2006).
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The director of the Kfar Etzion Field School, Amichai Noam, presented a similarly
cosmopolitan vision of the Jerusalem landscape when he referred to the human relationship with
this ancient landscape and its surrounding hills as adam ba’har (“man in the mountain”). He
explained:
It doesn’t really matter who lived here over the last thousands of years: the culture of the
traditional life in the mountain region of the Land of Israel is the same mountain culture
that the person who founded it created. The specific man changed, but the culture stayed,
and through this culture you can understand much better the environment as it is today,
the Arab neighbors who live next to us, and also our own past. If we want to understand
how our ancestors lived in this mountainous terrain, the best way to do it is to understand
the importance of adam ba’har (Noam, interview).
Pointing from his living room window toward the hilly landscape of the nature reserve
that borders his back yard in the Jewish settlement of Tkoa (south of Jerusalem), Noam outlined
his detailed socio-ecological approach. For him, the sense of identity and connection is derived
from an understanding of the landscape as a topographic and ecological zone that offers
particular climatic conditions that in turn dictate a certain social life. While supposedly not
concerned with the specific identity of the humans who have lived there over the years, this
unique way of life draws a connection between the current Jewish settlers of this place and their
biblical forefathers, who, per this narrative, were an early, if not the earliest and thus purportedly
the original, link in this chain of mountainous tradition.
Both the nof kdumim and the adam ba’har concepts express the value of the geophysical
terrain and its longstanding natural heritage. What is masked by these universalist concepts,
however, is that the landscape imagined through them then enables and also justifies the erasure
of existing landscapes that do not comply with this imaginary, and the “refugee landscape” first
and foremost among them. Joanna C. Long further explained, albeit in the context of JNF’s
arboreal landscaping project, that: “the innocence and organicism [] naturalises this
dispossession by creating a harmonious scene that is imagined to exist somewhere beyond
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politics. There is, of course, nothing natural about the process of Zionist colonisation. [] [T]hese
landscape imaginaries [] have been mobilized to perform important geopolitical and ideological
work towards the establishment and perpetuation of Israeli nationhood” (2009, 74; see also
Bardenstein 1998; Braverman 2009).
Place Figure 6 here: “Nof kdumim” (the ancient landscape) as seen from Mount Scopus
during an observation with INPA official “C.” Photo by author, February 2018.
“I Come for the Birds”: How INPA Officials See the Landscape
INPA official “C” has been quite frustrated with the maneuvers that his proposals for the
Mount Scopus National Park have sparked on both the left and the right of the political spectrum.
“From the right,” he told me, “the Mayor of Jerusalem and that of Maale Adumim say that the
national park is [a great plan] because it will connect Jerusalem to Maale Adumim. But this isn’t
good for me, because it’s making my story into a political one, while I honestly believe that this
national park will preserve nof kdumim—the ancient landscape of Jerusalem—for generations to
come.” While one might suggest that the national parks designation is a ploy intended for
colonial ends, it is clearly not experienced as such by the individuals who work in these
positions, thereby affording us a glimpse into how individual psychology enables this legal
regime to persist, and to justify itself, on the ground. Notably, however, in Har Homa (a few
kilometers southwest of Ma’ale Adumim) the national park has not provided such strict
protections when it came to enforcement against Jewish settlers, despite their noncompliance
with the nof kdumim ideal, and so, too, was the case in the Wadi Kana and Umm Zuka nature
reserves in the West Bank (Tatarski, interview).
Although he believes his vision as being exclusively concerned with nature protection
and thus as apolitical, this INPA official simultaneously holds that the importance of the legal
protection of the landscape provided by the national park status stems from the historical value
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of the landscape and its ties to the cultural heritage of one particular group: the Jewish people. It
then follows, for him, that as long as the local Palestinians help preserve this particular
natureculture landscape (namely, if they are native enough to support orientalist environmental
imaginaries), they may stay. The Palestinian presence is thus always conditional—they are
treated as means toward the end of reconstructing another people’s imaginary and physical
landscape. This is an excellent reminder of one of the central features of colonial (but not of
settler colonial) projects, which seek to emphasize the distinctions between settlers and natives
(Veracini 2013; Wolfe 2006), yet here with a local twist: in the revised order of things, the
“newer” native (namely, the Palestinian) is allowed to exist (dwell, cultivate) only in so far as her
identity forms and informs the allegedly more “original” native (namely, the Jew). Nativity
becomes a matter of degree, presenting yet another instance in which green becomes gray.
INPA’s perspective on natives, nature, and Palestinians was on colorful display in an
interview I conducted with one of its former inspectors (herein: INPA official “B”). This
interviewee described Israel as an “island” of nature protection amidst a sea of Arab degradation,
with East Jerusalem as a corridor between these two conflicting geographies and worldviews. In
his words,
Because they hunt without any barriers anywhere in the Arab countries, Israel stays
relatively abundant in terms of nature, kind of like an island, for some of the species [at
least]. And then [the Palestinians] hunt here, pass it to East Jerusalem and from there to
the territories. Now, every time we get a warrant to bust places in East Jerusalem, people
are like, “You’re oppressing us because it’s East Jerusalem.” That’s Bullshit! I come for
the birds. Shmulik, Amsalem, Ahmed, or Joe—I really don’t care, here or there
(interview; see also Braverman n.d.).
According to this INPA official, his work is about protecting goldfinches and gazelles (“I come
for the birds”) and has nothing to do with humans. “I don’t care about politics. Nature, and
nature alone, is my flag,” another INPA official told me (Hatzofe, interview). Such a “nature is
our only flag” narrative could be challenged in this context, as the densely populated villages of
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East Jerusalem are hardly the typical setting for a national park (and indeed, as I already
mentioned, this is the only place where Israel designated parks in the midst of a densely built
environment). At the same time, one must realize that the INPA officials are also authorized to
protect wild animals wherever they might be, i.e. also beyond the boundaries of these parks.
Accordingly, one of the Jerusalem inspectors told me in great detail how goldfinches are
trafficked and sold in East Jerusalem’s black market and how the illicit wildlife trade takes
advantage of the gray areas—both physically and legally—of this conflict zone to make quick
profit (INPA official “D”). On his part, INPA official “B” doesn’t agree that the problem is
economic, insisting that it is part of a stronger cultural preferences. In his words:
It’s very common with the Arabs, [who believe] that God gave us these animals so we
can hunt and eat, and for no other reason. . . . They really like to shoot. We’re on the bird
migration line to Africa. They love shooting at the birds when they’re in flight. It
happens] everywhere all the time! It’s illegal. They shoot, and then we treat them in
Israel (INPA official “B”).
Highly versed in the contemporary literature on Indigenous hunting rights practiced elsewhere,
this officer further emphasized that, unlike in those contexts, hunting by “Arabs” isn’t a form of
sustenance, but is performed solely for entertainment purposes. He finally concluded:
At the end of the day, after all the philosophy and humanism—and I’m all for
humanism—you need to take a stand. You need to decide, otherwise you can ride the
fence and endlessly talk about whether it’s okay to let them hunt porcupines and turtles
because it’s part of their social culinary heritage or not. But by the time you finish
thinking about this, there will be no more gazelles! (ibid.)
From INPA’s perspective, then, Israel operates as an island of humanism and legality,
protecting its natureculture heritage, which includes vulnerable wild species, from the
destruction wrought by the Palestinian savage. “Palestinians and Arabs really like to eat
porcupine,” this official told me, commenting about their cruelty when, while hunting, they
unnecessarily strike porcupines over the head until their painful death. Situated in between these
two bifurcated modalities of enforcement, East Jerusalem is, again, a hybrid space: not
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completely militarized yet not fully integrated, enforcement here is executed by INPA, alongside
the military police (magav). Animal bodies and mobilities, such as those of the goldfinches
trafficked through East Jerusalem, defy the normalization of the landscape, exemplifying its
fluidity and instability on the ground (see also Braverman, forthcoming; Gutkowksi,
forthcoming).
Walaje: Refa’im Valley National Park
A few kilometers from Silwan / the City of David as the crow (or the goldfinch) flies, the
village of Walaje is situated both within and outside of the Green Line and is thus caught
between the Separation Wall and the Jerusalem municipality (Joronen 2019). Recently, the
village’s agricultural lands were also designated as a national park, which celebrates the ancient
terrace features that have preserved traditional agricultural practices. Additionally, the village’s
spring (Ein Hanya) and its surroundings were designated as an archeological park due to findings
excavated there from the First Temple and early Christian eras (Shuster & Hasson 2018; see
Figure 7). Similar features in the nearby village of Battir have led to its designation as a
UNESCO Cultural Heritage Site (UNESCO n.d.). INPA’s official explained the importance of
the natureculture features of both terrace and spring and thus the justification for their protected
legal status at this site:
The farmers in this area used two agricultural methods: one is the manmade springs and
the other is the terraces. All these springs, they built pools around them and from these
water pools systems of cisterns provided water from the high point downhill to areas
where they grew vegetables. The terraces were built on steep slopes that couldn’t be
cultivated, in turn making them available for agriculture. They create a horizontal space,
while also storing the rainfall and enabling more seepage of the water—i.e., more water
in the system. They say that terraces started in the First Temple period. The Book of
Isaiah suggests that the most fertile land was with the Philistines, and that in order to
create agriculture, the Israelites needed to settle the hills and transition them into
agricultural lands. Terraces have then become the local enterprise for generations. Every
household that has made the land arable passed it on to their kids who needed more, so
they built and expanded. This didn’t happen in one day. If the terraces were abandoned, a

21

few dozens of years and they would disappear. They needed constant upkeeping. Rain
comes and it seeps into the ground and rocks fall and roll downhill and then also the
terrain that supports the terraces gets washed away and it goes back to being rocky land.
After the Jews were exiled, these terraces have continued to be the agricultural enterprise
of anybody who came to this region and lived here (interview, INPA official “C”;
emphasis by author).
Place Figure 7 here: Palestinian Israeli lawyer Quamar Mishirqi-Assad at Ein Hanya
during INPA’s restoration of the spring, Jerusalem National Park. Photo by author,
February 2018.
In 2002, the newly constructed Separation Wall left the Hanya spring and most of
Walaje’s terraces on the Israeli side, while the villagers who privately own the land that the
spring is situated upon, and who have maintained the spring and cultivated this land for centuries
in certain instances, have come to reside on the other side of the Wall (Figure 8). According to
Aviv Tatarski, an Israeli activist from the nonprofit Ir Amim who has supported the village’s
struggle for over a decade, the spring used to be a local meeting place for all. “You could come
and see Palestinians and Israelis, even settlers, sitting around the large pool of water,” Tatarski
told me (on the importance of springs as natureculture anchors in the occupied West Bank see
Braverman 2019). In 2016, INPA embarked on a major renovation of the spring as a central
component of the Jerusalem Park project. This involved moving the existing Walaje checkpoint
into Area A and therefore depriving access to the terraces and spring to Palestinians on the other
side of the Wall, even though they legally own this land. One of the Palestinian farmers showed
me the tunnel he must travel through to visit his forefathers’ graveyards and told me about the
tenuous access arrangements he has had to negotiate to visit this sacred site (Abu Bassem,
Mishirqi-Assad & Tatarski, interviews).
Place Figure 8 here: Overlooking Walaje: mountains, terraces, and the Separation Wall.
Photo by author, February 2018.
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More generally, Tatarski described the dichotomy between Israel and the West Bank
when it comes to park management, and Jerusalem’s hybrid and liminal status in this context. In
his words:
In nature reserves there are more regulations and limitations than in national parks. But
once you designate them, both are regulated under the Israel Nature and Parks Authority.
The implication is that human activity needs to be limited. Even if you own the land
privately, it is not expropriated, but what you can do with the land is severely limited. In
the occupied territories, since a lot of the land is privately owned by Palestinians, one of
the methods is to take the land without officially expropriating it, and then suddenly they
become under the authority of an Israeli body. This is what happened in Walaje. The
Jerusalem municipality, together with the Israel Nature and Parks Authority, are now
advancing a park called Refa’im Valley on these 1,200 dunams. Because it’s considered
Israel, and the Israeli law applies—unlike Wadi Kana where it is a military rule—
basically the law offers lots more regulation and protection to the residents. Theoretically,
this dictates an entire process that is supposed to protect their rights. But that’s not
actually the case (interview, December 2016).
Again, the gray legalities imposed on a landscape that has come under Israeli sovereignty, which
does not include granting citizen rights to the people residing on this land, enable practices that
reorder the landscape so that it closely aligns with the Jewish national enterprise.
Tatarski also described the roundabout way in which he had found out about the plans to
designate Walaje’s private lands as a national park:
One day, I went to Walaje to visit one of the activists I know there. I went on a road that
is not supposed to be for Walaje residents, as it leads to Jerusalem, where they are not
officially allowed to go. I saw a new sign on the side of the road, and so I stopped. The
sign was only in Hebrew, which most residents can’t read. It declared the plan to
construct a national park. I took a photo and alerted my friends in the village. It could’ve
happened without the village knowing about it, which goes to tell you about Israel’s
regard of Palestinian ownership rights. The reason [INPA] gave for constructing the park
is that it was created by an ancient farming heritage. They suggested that it may be the
only living example of a biblical landscape. The terrace landscape in Walaje is
supposedly how the land of Judea looked like 2,000 years ago (ibid.).
This quote highlights the porousness between the nature regime practiced in East Jerusalem and
that practiced in the West Bank, when the local population is not even assured proper notice
about a park’s designation, not to mention participation in the proposed plans. For Tatarski, this
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story highlights how Israel uses nature to obfuscate political interests, and how the landscape is
employed to reimagine the temporalities of this place and the rightful presence in it of certain
populations only. As he recounted:
Why is this story so important? One part is the usual way that Israel puts the past over the
present: it is now Palestinian land, but it used to be part of the Jewish heritage. So we can
imagine what it used to be in the past, and in the name of our historical rights we can then
disregard present rights. But if you’re so interested in traditional agriculture—no modern
machinery, no tractors, everything by hand, organic, irrigated by spring water, just like it
was 500 and 2,000 years ago—if that is so important to you, you should be concerned
about the farmers, not only about the landscape. [They are those who] keep it alive. But
the documents of the national park service don’t mention Walaje at all. Not even one
sentence mentioning the farmers who today, not in the past, are creating this landscape;
who are needed, today, to keep this landscape alive. And there’s no talk about the threat
to this landscape by the Separation Barrier. [They] only talk about creating a natural area
for the wellbeing of [West] Jerusalem’s residents.
According to Tatarski, then, the designation of national parks is a means for imposing the Jewish
past upon the Palestinian presence through the construction, and then the preservation, of the
physical landscape. INPA official “C” expressed this exact notion in our interview when he
exclaimed that:
The important asset or value of a heritage landscape is that it is maintained by the people
like it was originally, or like it was in the past. The objections from Walaje were that we
found a way to nationalize our lands and take them. We declared, and we stand behind
this, that all of their lands are still theirs. That’s the law. A natural reserve is not an
appropriation of private land, it is a designation of this land. And the designation here is
to keep the terraces and the old traditions alive. The more the locals do it themselves, the
better for the national park.
Utilizing a hair-splitting legal distinction between appropriation and designation, this
official insists on seeing the nature-law landscape as fair and just. According to this narrative, the
Palestinian body needn’t be physically eliminated. Instead, her labor and identity can be
efficiently appropriated to contribute to the larger project of making the Jewish homeland into
the imaginary and physical landscape of nof kdumim, namely—the way it supposedly looked like
when the Jewish forefathers lived there (see also Noam, interview). This practice, which may be
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referred to as “self-indigenizing by proxy,” presents a mimicry of the imagined past, which is in
fact forced upon the colonized population. The Jewish people are in turn construed as the
original, and thus more indigenous, people of the region (Zureik 2015). Alongside the display of
an authentic and connected Jewish landscape, a compartmentalized reality is at play that
enhances the precariousness of the Walaje landscape. Mikko Joronen wrote in this context:
“Area C, Area B, seam zone, and the Jerusalem part of the village—are run by different (but
overlapping) regulations, permit systems, and logics” (2019, 852; see also Berda 2017; Chiodelli
2017). Again, legal permutations dictate physical and discursive landscapes, which in turn feed
back into the legal terrain.
The ideological significance of the particular national park regime in Jerusalem in
rendering the past legible through the landscape was further illustrated by INPA official “C”,
again providing a window into how these officials, and possibly also the settler communities that
some of them are part of, justify these practices. In his words:
Everyone says “Wow” about the amazing archeology of the Roman culture that was here
and utilized thousands of slaves. But our Forefathers, they didn’t leave such an
archeology or places with the same “Wow.” The connection that they left for us in the
landscape are terraces and olive presses. Even their houses didn’t really survive because
they had simple houses like the fellahin [i.e., the Palestinian farmers]. You can’t see it,
because you don’t have an archeology of their life. This, here [points to the Palestinian
terrace landscape], is our archeology, our people’s archeology. When you see the view of
the Land of Israel—the view around Jerusalem, the corridor from Jerusalem westward—
that is the real culture of the simple people who lived here. This culture is manmade. And
when you keep maintaining and using it, its value grows to be outstanding. You can see
here the village of Battir. The terraces out there, they’re green, they’re green with lettuce,
parsley, all types of vegetables (interview).
The involvement of local Palestinian farmers in the protection of the allegedly ancient terrace
landscape is also an inherent part of an ecotourism scheme that draws on the historical
uniqueness of the area—solidified under UNESCO’s designation of one such terrace systems as
a world heritage site—to celebrate and promote it as a normal and legitimate recreational site
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rather than one of dispossession and elimination. Relatedly, in the name of protecting the terrace
culture of this place (and the adam ba’har ideal), Jewish settlers from Gush Etzion and
Palestinians from the neighboring villages have come together to oppose the construction of the
Separation Wall in this area (Reynolds 2017; Noam, interview). They were later joined by no
other than INPA in a dramatic statement to the Supreme Court against the Israeli government’s
position—pitting one government agency against the other (Katz-Mink 2012). Nature yet again
emerges as an ostensibly apolitical project that transcends and erases differences, thereby
promoting a supposed normality. At the same time, across the hill from Walaje, Palestinian
farmers were hired under contract from INPA to tend to the terraces in another national park
(reminiscent of Salim Tamari’s discussion on “building other people’s homes”—here, other
people’s natural landscapes; see Tamari 1981). When the Palestinians were no longer able to
access the park because of the Separation Wall, trained INPA officials promptly took their place
(Tatarski, interview).
Alongside INPA’s territorial practices that de facto control and dispossess Palestinians,
which highlight the continued juxtaposition of settler and native and are thus a central tenet of
colonialism, other practices are also at play here that are meant to eliminate the native through
integration and normalization—specifically, by making the national parks into sites of modern
and global tourism—practices that are more characteristic of settler colonial practices (Busbridge
2018; Veracini 2006; Wolfe 2006; 2012). Coercion, normalization, and cooperation—central
facets of colonial and settler colonial regimes—are thus intertwined in these stories and manifest
in the spectacular battles over the landscape of East Jerusalem.
Conclusion
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Landscape is too important to be allowed, any longer, to be the dreamwork—or the
groundwork—of empire. Landscape studies must be dedicated to seeing that landscape becomes
the groundwork—and dreamwork—of justice.
---Don Mitchell 2003, 793.
Once I sat on the steps by a gate at David’s Tower. I placed my two heavy baskets at my side. A
group of tourists was standing around their guide and I became their target marker. “You see that
man with the baskets? Just right of his head there’s an arch from the Roman period. Just right of
his head.” “But he’s moving, he’s moving!” I said to myself: “redemption will come only if their
guide tells them, ‘You see that arch from the Roman period? It’s not important: but next to it, left
down and a bit, there sits a man who’s bought fruit and vegetables for his family.’”
---Yehuda Amichai, Tourists
This article sought to explore the national parks apparatus in East Jerusalem and its
complex enterprise of landscape production that fuses the national with the vernacular. Recalling
my own childhood experience of the East Jerusalem landscape, I showed how Israel has been
positioning itself as a green nation that cares for the region’s natural resources and that preserves
them for everybody’s benefits. Interviews with INPA officials illustrate, accordingly, that they
perceive their task as one that protects the true underdogs of the region—nonhuman animals such
as finches and gazelles as well as ancient agricultural traditions such as terraces and springs—
and not as one aimed at discriminating against Palestinians. This, in fact, is portrayed as an
unpleasant and undesirable byproduct that arises from the fundamental and inherent clash
between the Palestinian culture, and their perceived barbaric treatment of nature and animals,
with Israel’s more progressive nature protection agenda. This article attempted to show that such
a designation of national parks and other traditional forms of nature protection are an integral
part of a (settler) colonial infrastructure, which shares much in common with multiple sites of
conservation around the world (Agrawal and Redford 2009; Davis 2013; Peluso 1993; Spence
1999), thus further illuminating why conservation and justice are so often depicted as adversarial
projects.
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In the two national parks studied here, the presence of the Palestinian residents—who
currently own and cultivate the lands and who in some cases have often dwelled on it for
centuries—has become subordinate to the reconstruction of an imagined landscape of nof
kdumim. This particular imaginary landscape is in turn projected onto the physical landscape in
East Jerusalem by Israel’s nature protection agency. This kind of nature preservation occurs
through active practices of erasing and making the landscape, which on the one hand require the
elimination of Palestinian “refugee camps” and, on the other hand, elevates, essentializes, and
protects the agrarian terrace landscape (“adam ba’har”). The legal protection of this natural
landscape in turn facilitates the narrative of past Jewish indigeneity, thereby supporting nof
kdumim, or the ancient landscape.
Throughout, I emphasized the crucial role and the heightened rule of law in the making of
the natural landscapes of this place, stressing how systems of regulation and governance are
coproduced alongside the ongoing making of cultural and material worlds (Wylie 2007, 190). In
other words, I showed how landscape is “a particular sort of legal and political entity” (Olwig
2002, 19). Rather than being static and fixed, the landscape thus emerges as a malleable and
interactive scene that fluctuates between the extremes of legal and illegal, personal and
collective, memory and erasure, belonging and exile, dwelling and movement, and integration
and coercion. Finally, I also highlighted the hybridity of the East Jerusalem landscape as it
embodies a mix of colonial and settler colonial features. Accordingly, Silwan’s Palestinian
residents are dispossessed from their homes as the land literally collapses from beneath them (or
is demolished upon them)—presenting a typical colonial setting—while in Walaje an
understanding that the terraces of the Jewish forefathers need to be routinely attended to has
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resulted in that the local fellahin are tolerated and even idealized in certain instances (but not
always, as documented by Joronen 2019)—thereby presenting a typical settler colonial scheme.
The technology of dispossession depicted in this article—the severing of Palestinians
from their lands through their designation as nature reserves and national parks—is symbolic as
much as it is physical. The Palestinian farmer is now made to serve the Zionist narrative of
redemption and return, as her presence is subsumed into a past of historic significance that is not
her own. And while the rule of law and the innocuousness of nature are utilized to redesign the
natural landscape as one that is in need of protection by Israel’s nature authorities, on the ground
actors simultaneously operate to normalize these sites as displays of historical Jewish
significance in the service of environmental and archeological tourism. The natural landscape
has been recruited, only to discover that it has always been Jewish.
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